(1-3) Lease "general rules of leasing: rights and obligations of parties to lease contract: lessor's obligations: obligation to enable lessee to enjoy benefit of the leased premises". Judgment: "reasoning of: defects of proof: unsound reasoning, misapplication of law".  Suit, "Defence in suit: Crucial Defence". Contract, "Lease Contract".

 

(1)     Lease Contract: belongs to the commutative type of contract. Rental fee being in exchange for benefit of premises. When due. Condition of. Enabling lessee to enjoy the benefit of the leased premises.

 

(2)     Assertive claim or defense that would change opinion on suit. Court of First Instance is bound to consider in its reasoning. Failure to do so considered faulty.

 

(3)     Appellant's defense that they leased from Respondent thirty six premises under preliminary written agreements and paid in advance certain amounts to reserve them, but received possession of only seven premises, and that, accordingly, the rental fee should accrue in respect of only those seven premises, is a crucial defense. The conclusion reached by the appealed judgment ordering Appellant to pay rental for all premises, based on an expert opinion who computed the rentals as of the dates of the lease contracts without considering the said Appellant's defense, is faulty. Reason for.  

 

1-  Decided – in the judgment of this Court, that the rent or lease contract belongs to the commutative contracts where obligations of the parties are connected concurrently. Rent, being for benefit enjoyment, falls due for lessor or landlord only when the latter has enabled lessee or tenant to enjoy the benefit of occupying the leased premises.

 

2-  Decided – in the judgment of this Court – that  any claim or defense asserted before the Court of First Instance, that deciding upon which may result in change of opinion in the suit, must be considered by the court in its reasoning, otherwise its judgment will be flawed.

 

3-  As Appellant held tenaciously to their defense that they leased from Respondent thirty six premises under preliminary written agreements and paid in advance certain amounts to reserve them, but received possession of only seven premises, and that, accordingly, the rental fee should accrue in respect of only those seven premises, is a crucial defense. The conclusion reached by the appealed judgment ordering Appellant to pay rental for all premises, based on an expert opinion who computed the rentals as of the dates of the lease contracts without considering the said Appellant's defense, so, judgment is flawed.

 

Where Appellant insisted on their defense before the Court of First Instance that the negotiations between them included thirty six premises for which initial agreements were signed but not consummated, that certain amounts were paid for reserving them, that no lease contracts for them were made, that lessor surrendered possession of only seven of them, so that accruing rent must be limited to seven premises only, and if such defence regarding the surrender by the lessor of the leased premises to lessee is crucial and is likely to result in change of opinion in the suit, since the reason for accrual of the rent is enabling lessee to enjoy the benefit of the leased premises through putting him in possession thereof; all that being so, and since appealed judgment did not consider this crucial defense, being just content with the expert report which computed the rentals as of the dates of such lease contracts, saying nothing about lessee being in possession of all these premises, nor the dates of such possession on which the calculation of the rent should start after the grace period in each contract and such proof all that, then the appealed judgment is faulty.

Court:

After reviewing the papers and hearing the report, read by the reporting judge, pleading, and after deliberation.

Whereas the appeal has satisfied its formal conditions;

The facts, as stated in the appealed judgment and the other papers, are that Appellant company instituted Suit No. Full Civil Circuit claiming to order Respondent first: to pay 2419090/50 Riyals; second: return cheques delivered in advance rent payment in the sum of  3,299,476 Riyals in cash or value. Explaining its claim it said that it leased from Respondent seven premises in the commercial complex owned by them for a term of five years starting on 1/7/2002 and ending on 30/6/2007 and agreed that Appellant give Respondent cheques covering the total rent for the five years. For financial difficulties Appellant decided not to carry on with the lease contracts and agreed with Respondent in writing on 15/1/2003 to terminate the lease contracts and stop possession of the premises and to settle the financial matters later. Despite returning possession to Respondent, but they continued to cash the cheques held by them and refused to carry out the agreement. So, they filed the suit. The court appointed an expert and after submitting his report, Respondent made a counterclaim against Appellant for the amount of 1,281,444 Riyals representing its dues after the settlement made by the deputized expert. The court decreed on the original suit that Respondent pay to Appellant the sum of (2,018,032) Riyals and refused the counterclaim. Respondent appealed by Appeal No. 228/2007 and Appellant appealed by Appeal No. 230/2007 and the court joined the two appeals and returned the expert report to its author to examine the objections by the two litigant parties and after his complementary report, the court, on 27/2 /2008 regarding Appeal No. 228/2007 decided to cancel the appealed judgment and ordered Appellant to pay to Respondent 1,281,444 Riyals and with regard to Appeal No. 230/2007 returning the twelve cheques attached with the papers to Appellant and denying the rest of judgment. Appellant appealed this judgment for cassation, which was put before this court in the consultation room for fixing a date for hearing.

 

Whereas, the Appellant company argues against appealed judgment for unsoundness of reasoning and inconsistency with the facts of the case, and explaining that it says that he persisted in its defense before the Court of First Instance that it negotiated with Respondent for leasing from them thirty six premises in the commercial complex owned by them for which they signed initial agreements and he paid certain amounts to reserve such premises, but such agreement was not consummated by implementation in that lessor did not deliver the leased premises except seven of them for which written lease contracts were signed and possession thereof was surrendered – and as appealed judgment obligated them with the rents for thirty six premises not fully delivered by Respondent, without considering their defense, which was a crucial one, thus, appealed judgment is faulty and requires cassation.

 

Whereas, this argument is in place, in the judgment of this Court, for the rent or lease contract belongs to the commutative type of contract where obligations of the parties are connected concurrently, that the rent being against enjoyment of benefit, falls due for lessor or landlord only when the latter has enabled lessee to enjoy the benefit of the leased premises. And that any claim or defense asserted before the Court of First Instance, which, if decided upon, is likely to result in changing opinion in the suit, must be considered by the court in its reasoning, otherwise its judgment will be flawed. That being so, and since Appellant persisted in their defense before the Court of First Instance that the negotiations between them included thirty six premises for which initial agreements were signed but not consummated, that certain amounts paid in advance for reserving them, that no lease contracts for them were signed, and that lessor surrendered possession of only seven of them, so that accruing rent must be limited to seven premises only, and that as this defence of non-surrender of leased premises to lessee by lessor is crucial and is likely to result in change of opinion in the suit, since the reason for accrual of rent is enjoyment of the benefit of the leased premises through putting lessee in possession thereof; for all these reasons, and since appealed judgment did not consider this crucial defense, and just contented itself with the expert report which computed the rentals as of the dates of the lease contracts, saying nothing about lessee taking possession of all the premises or not, nor the dates of such possession on which the calculation of such rent should be starting after the grace period in each contract nor proof of all that, therefore, appealed judgment is faulty and worthy of cassation without need to consider any more reasons.