The Court

Having reviewed the documents and having heard the arguments and the report read out by the Judge-Rapporteur, and after the deliberations and upon the satisfaction of the formal requirements of the appeal;
The facts, as revealed by the appealed judgment and other documents, may be summed up as follows:
The Respondent brought the claim No. 62/2006 – Labour – General – applying for a judgment ordering the Appellant, in his capacity as Receiver of the (--) company, to pay the amounts of 392,416.4 Riyals as deserved employment payments, and 200,000 Riyals as compensation, and ordering the company to deliver to the Respondent a certificate of experience for the full term of service with the Appellant, a travel ticket to his home country, and his salary inclusive of allowances for the period from the date of the claim to the date of judgment, being the amount of 20,300 Riyals.The Respondent stated that he worked for the Appellant company in the post of car maintenance workshop supervisor by virtue of a contract of employment dated 25.2.1981. He continued such service under successive contracts until his salary reached the amount of 12,000 Riyals. He submitted his resignation on 11.8.2006. As the Appellant refused to pay him his financial dues, he brought the claim. The court appointed an expert and issued a judgment ordering the Appellant to pay to the Respondent the amount of 317,680 Riyals, and to deliver to him a certificate of experience and a return air ticket to his home country. The Respondent lodged an appeal No. 407/2008, and the Appellant likewise lodged an appeal No. 482/2008. The court combined the two appeals and issued a judgment on 22.1.2009 affirming the appealed judgment. The Appellant lodged an appeal by cassation, which was presented to this Court, at the deliberations chamber, and a hearing session was fixed for its consideration.
The appeal by cassation is based on three reasons. First, the Appellant contends against the judgment that it erred in the application of the law. The Appellant states that the judgment concluded that the Respondent deserved the end-of-service indemnity for the period from 1.1.1994 to 1.1.2005, noting that the contract dated 1.1.1994 was concluded under Law No. 3 of 1962, which provided in Section 25 that a foreign employee working at a national institution does not deserve the end-of-service indemnity under Section 24. Furthermore, the contract of service included a provision that the Respondent does not deserve such indemnity. The Labour Law No. 14 of 2004, which provides that foreign employees deserve end-of-service indemnity, applies only as of its coming into force on 1.1.2005. Accordingly, the judgment that the Respondent deserved the end-of-service indemnity for the aforesaid period is defective and worthy of appeal by cassation.
This contention is incorrect.  Section 17(c) of Law No. 3 of 1962 provides that “…In the case of renewal of the contract, the extension period shall be considered an extension of the previous period and the service of the employee shall be computed, for the purposes of any benefit or privilege to be acquired throughout his service, as of the date he commenced employment with the employer for the first time”.The employment relationship between the Appellant company and the Respondent – as undisputed by the parties – continued from 25.2.1981 up to the presentation of his resignation on 11.8.2006, by virtue of successive contracts of employment. The Appellant had previously paid the Respondent an end-of-service indemnity payment for the period from 25.2.1981 to 31.12.1993. The Appellant has thereby acquired a right in such indemnity of which he should not be deprived as regards any subsequent term of service, whether by conduct or by stating such deprivation in any subsequent contract through which his service would be connected. Should the appealed judgment be in accord with this viewpoint, which is legally appropriate, then the contention becomes inappropriate.
In his second and third reasons,the Appellant contends against the appealed judgment that it has been deficient in reasoning and in breach of the right of defence. The Appellant states that it submitted two statements before the court of first instance in response to the two expert reports (the original and the complementary), asserting that such expert did not follow the appropriate proceduresin discharging his duties and clarifying the deficiencies in the reports. However, the judgment passed by the court of first instance, as well as the appealed judgment, have both relied on the results of the reports in disregard of the crucial arguments against them, which renders the appealed judgment defective and worthy of appeal by cassation.
This contention is inadmissible. Section 4 of Law No. 12 of 2005 on Appeal by Cassation on non-criminal provisions makes it mandatory that the statement of appeal by cassation shall include the reasons on which the appeal is founded. The intention behind such statement is that the reasons for the appeal by cassation shall be specified and clearly defined so as to sufficiently reveal the objective of such appeal in such a way as to negate any ambiguity or ignorance, and to show the judgment defect which the Appellant relates to the judgment, its position in the judgment and its effect on its jurisprudence. Since the Appellant, while stating the contention, failed to state in the statement of appeal by cassation the objections directed against the two reports by the expert, the relevance of such objections to the two reports, and the effect of each of them on the jurisprudence of the appealed judgment, such contention shall then be considered as ambiguous and is accordingly inadmissible.
Accordingly, the appeal by cassation shall hereby be dismissed.